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Abstract 
 
 
While compensation accounts for roughly 90 percent of K-12 instructional costs, there is 
little evidence of rational design in these systems.   This chapter reviews the nature of 
teacher compensation systems in developed economies and research on their performance 
effects.   Since these compensation schemes typically arise out of collective negotiations, 
this chapter also surveys the smaller literature on the effect of teacher collective 
bargaining on earnings and school outcomes.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
 During the 2006-07 school year, the most current year for which national data are 
available, U.S. public schools spent $187 billion for salaries and $59 billion for benefits 
for instructional personnel.  These compensation payments account for 55 percent of K-
12 current expenditures and 90 percent of instructional expenditures (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2009).  As large as these expenditures are, they do not fully capture the 
resources committed to K-12 compensation, since they do not include billions of dollars 
of unfunded liabilities of pension funds and retiree health insurance for teachers and 
administrators (Pew Center on the States, 2010).  If productivity doubles for an input 
accounting for one percent of total cost, the overall social gain will be modest.   
However, given the large share of K-12 costs that arise from educator compensation, 
even small gains in efficiency can yield large social dividends. 
 There is ample reason to believe that significant efficiency gains can be found.   
Educator compensation “systems” are neither strategic nor integrated.  In a well-run 
organization, the total compensation package – salaries, current and deferred benefits – 
would be structured with an eye toward overall firm performance.  Tradeoffs between 
different types of salary and benefits would be carefully scrutinized.  Not only the level, 
but the structure of salaries would take account of market benchmarks, as well as 
performance effects.  In public education, however, overall teacher compensation arises 
not out of a rational planning process, but rather emerges as an amalgam of different 
components or “silos”, reflecting pressures from different constituencies, legislative 
mandates,  legacies from  earlier vintages of collective bargaining agreements, and other 
institutional and political factors, with little or no consideration for overall efficiency.  
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Neither starting nor senior salaries are market-based.  In the United States, teacher pay is 
set by salary schedules that have evolved over decades of collective bargaining 
agreements or, in many non-bargaining states, legislative fiat.  Base pay is augmented by 
various types of district or state-wide salary supplements (e.g., coaching, career ladder).  
Deferred compensation in the form of retirement pay inhabits another silo altogether, 
with policy set by statewide pension boards  often dominated by senior educators and 
administrators.  Teacher compensation is the sum of all of these parts (plus fringe 
benefits such as health insurance, typically negotiated at the district level).   There is no 
evidence that educator pay is market based or strategic in other developed nations.  As 
compared to the U.S.,  teacher pay setting is usually more centralized, at a regional or 
prefectural level, often with differences by school level or type, but not market-driven. 1   
  Concern over school performance and teacher quality is stimulating interest in 
more efficient and performance-oriented teacher compensation regimes. This, in turn, has 
stimulated research on the performance effects of teacher compensation and collective 
bargaining.  This paper provides a survey of several strands of this literature, with a focus 
on economic studies.  Our discussion proceeds from a more aggregate, or “macro,” 
perspective on overall levels and trends in teacher compensation to a more disaggregated, 
or “micro,” discussion of the structure of teacher pay.  First, we examine research on the 
overall level of teacher pay and possible quantity-quality trade-offs with pay and staffing 
ratios.  This is closely related to the issue of the overall decline in teacher quality 
associated with reduced labor market barriers for women.  Then we turn our attention to 
the structure of teacher pay and the “single salary schedule,” which is the primary 
determinant of teacher salaries in the U.S., and consider other institutional features of the 
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labor market that exacerbate or dampen the effects of these salary schedules.  We then 
examine the incentives produced by teacher retirement benefit systems.  Since teacher 
compensation is largely structured by collective bargaining, it is appropriate to conclude 
the survey with a review of the small, but important, literature on the effects of collective 
bargaining on resource allocation in K-12 education.  Given the central role of teachers in 
school performance and of compensation in K-12 school spending, we conclude that 
educator compensation is a surprisingly undeveloped area of education policy research.  
However, research can only progress in this area if education authorities create 
“regulatory space” for experimentation with teacher compensation models and permit 
their evaluation. 
 
2.  Studies of Relative Teacher Pay 
There has been a lively debate about the overall level of teacher salaries and a 
corollary discussion as to whether teachers are “underpaid.”  In the United States, this 
discussion has been related to the question of whether the elimination of labor market 
barriers for women (and the ensuing higher earnings opportunities) lowered the quality of 
the public school teaching workforce. The “crowding thesis” holds that, prior to advances 
in civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation, barriers to entry in other professions 
crowded well educated and academically talented women into K-12 teaching positions.  
With the decline of discriminatory barriers in other professions such as accounting, 
management, law and medicine, teachers who would have been pushed into teaching 
were now able to escape to other professions.  In the absence of significant increases in 
relative pay for teachers, the relative quality of the teaching workforce fell.   
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One problem in examining long term trends in teacher quality is that even 
rudimentary measures of teacher quality, such as test scores or academic credentials, are 
not available in a long time series.  Several studies have taken up the empirical challenge 
of documenting the hypothesized secular decline in the relative quality of female 
teachers.2  Several authors have made use of various waves of longitudinal studies to 
examine long term changes in the quality of the female teaching workforce.  Corcoran, 
Evans, and Schwab (2004) draw on five different longitudinal surveys of high school 
graduation cohorts from 1957 to 1992 to document the decline in female teacher quality 
as measured by high school test scores.   They find only a slight decline in the average 
academic quality of female teachers relative to the universe of female high school 
graduates.   However, they find a substantial drop in the share of females in the highest 
academic quintile who become teachers.  Interestingly,  they find no such drop for male 
teachers.  The female finding is replicated in Hoxby and Leigh (2004), who examine nine 
cohorts of the Recent College Graduates survey, spanning 1963 to 2000.   They, too, find 
that the probability a new college graduate from the highest academic quintile (as 
measured by college selectivity)  enters teaching falls from 20 to 4 percent – a much 
larger drop than any other quintile.  Bacolod (2007a), examines several waves of the 
National Longitudinal Survey, and compares the probability of entry into teaching across 
different birth cohorts (1940-49 through 1960-69).   She finds a sharp relative drop in the 
probability that high ability teachers (as measured by the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test, or AFQT) become teachers.  (See also, Bacolod, 2007b for an analysis of further 
longitudinal data analysis.)  
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Although the sample sizes of teachers in each of these studies are modest, the 
findings are largely consistent with one another and are relatively robust to different 
measures of quality.  Each of these studies find modest declines in the quality of teachers 
at the mean, but much sharper declines at the upper tails of the distribution.   With the 
large increase in college attendance and completion rates for females between 1960 and 
2000, the probability of a female graduate becoming a teacher declines over time, but the 
proportionate drop is greatest in the top ability quintiles.   This is a nuanced version of the 
“overcrowding” thesis.  Relative teacher quality at the median has not greatly declined.   
The major loss has been in the upper academic tail. 
Given the paucity of data providing direct measures of teacher quality such as 
academic test scores, some researchers (Hanushek and Rivkin, 1997; Lakdawalla,  2006;  
Stoddard, 2003) treat relative teacher pay (e.g., teacher pay relative to all college 
graduates) as a measure of relative teacher quality.  The most reliable of these pay 
measures is annual earnings data from the Dicennial Census.  Using these Census data, 
Hanushek and Rivkin (2006, Figure 1) compute the percent of college graduates earning 
less than the average teacher.  For women, this percentage fell from roughly 55 percent in 
1950 to 45 percent in 2000, with most of this decline occuring from 1950 to 1970.  A 
similar pattern occurs for men, although they start from a much lower base.   Note that 
these calculations of annual relative earnings take no account of current and deferred 
benefits, or annual hours of work, two issues we will consider in more detail below.3 
 The coincidence of the decline in relative teacher pay for females and the decline 
in the relative academic quality of teachers naturally leads many researchers to infer a 
causal relationship from the former to the latter.   Hoxby and Leigh (2004) provide a 
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more comprehensive analysis of this issue by examining the roles of both the level of 
teacher pay relative to non-teacher earnings and the changes in dispersion of teacher pay 
within teaching.  The insight here is that a high ability woman contemplating entry into a 
profession is likely less concerned with pay at the median than at the upper deciles.   
Thus, Hoxby and Leigh estimate an occupational choice model that decomposes the 
relative pay variable into several components: median female teacher pay, the dispersion 
of female teacher pay, male-female pay in non-teaching, and a trend (male) in non-
teaching earnings.   They highlight a factor often ignored in relative teacher pay 
discussion – a large compression of intrastate teacher pay that coincided with the rise of 
teacher collective bargaining.   This had the result of producing a large compression of 
pay between the highest and lowest ability quintile of teachers.   In their decomposition, 
they distinguish the “push” of wage compression from the “pull” of relative pay outside 
of teaching.  They find that roughly 80 percent of the decline in the share of high ability 
candidates entering teaching is explained by the “push” of intrastate compression in 
teacher pay between 1963 and 2000.4    
 Several studies examine trends in earnings and measures of teacher academic 
quality in the UK.   Nickell and Quintini (2002) examine public sector pay and workforce 
quality from 1975 through 1999 based on two longitudinal surveys  They find clear 
evidence of slippage in the relative pay of both male and female teachers in the overall 
pay structure.   This coincides with a significant decline in the level of academic ability 
for male teachers but not for female teachers.  Chevalier, Dolton, and McIntosh (2007) 
provide a wider window on teacher quality by examining survey data on graduating 
cohorts of college students from 1960 through 1995 (surveyed six to seven years after 
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graduation).  They, too, find a larger quality decline for females.   However, by 2002 (i.e., 
the 1995 cohort) teacher quality had actually improved vis-à-vis non-teachers.5 
 
3.  Quantity versus Quality Tradeoffs 
Given that pay is set by governments and not by markets, a question arises as to 
how school districts have chosen to trade off the level of teacher pay with staffing ratios 
(i.e., the student-teacher ratio).6   When spending per student rises by ten percent, other 
things being equal, school administrators can raise teacher pay by ten percent and hold 
staffing ratios constant,  hold teacher pay constant and lower staffing ratios by ten 
percent, or  any combination of the two that adds up to ten percent.   Figure 1 presents 
data for U.S staff and enrollments in public schools, indexed to Fall 1980 levels.   It 
clearly shows the dip in enrollments by the mid-80’s and the subsequent rise as the baby 
boom echo entered the school system. By 2007 enrollments had grown by 21 percent.   
The upper two lines show the level of teacher and non-teacher employment.   Clearly the 
growth in staff far outstripped the growth in enrollments.  Teacher employment grew by 
46 percent, non-teacher employment grew by 53 percent, and the student-teacher ratio 
fell from 18.7 to 15.7 over the period.  Over the same period, real spending per student 
grew on average by 2.3 percent per year.  If the staffing ratio had been held constant, real 
teacher compensation could have grown by 78 percent over this period and would have 
produced an average 2007 teacher salary of $78,574.  In fact, teacher salaries grew by 
only 7 percent over this period, and the average teacher salary was $52,578.7  This is not 
a phenomenon unique to the U.S (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).   Lakdawalla 
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(2006) presents data showing that student-teacher ratios have been falling at least since 
the 1950’s in all of the major industrial nations. 
(Figure 1) 
 This human resource policy on the part of school districts is perplexing, especially 
given complaints about low teacher pay and “teacher shortages” that have occurred in the 
U.S and abroad.   The universality of this trend begs parochial explanations.   Several 
researchers have proposed economic explanations for this phenomenon.   Flyer and 
Rosen (1997) argue that individualized attention by school staff and parent household 
time are substitutes in consumption.  As family incomes and the shadow value of 
females’ time rise, households substitute  schooling  for mother’s time.  They examine 
state level data and find that declines in the student-teacher ratio are positively associated 
with increases in the labor force participation of women.8  However, we are aware of no 
data suggesting that more direct measures of substitutes for a mother’s time, such as the 
length of the school day or school year, rose over time or in response to higher female 
labor force participation rates.   Stoddard (2003) and Lakdawalla (2006) locate an 
explanation in K-12 education production.   Rising skill premia economy-wide have 
increased the price of academically-skilled teachers.  However, the relative productivity 
of academically skilled teachers in the K-12 education sector has not risen at the same 
rate.   Thus, schools rationally substitute unskilled for skilled teachers and quantity over 
quality.  
 Anticipating our discussion of collective bargaining below, theories of “efficient 
contracts” in the general labor economics literature may also shed light on this 
phenomenon.   In these models, unions value both higher earnings and more jobs and 
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bargain to an efficient contract with employers that involves more jobs but lower wages 
as compared to a simple monopoly model (Ashenfelter and Brown,  1986).9 
A common feature of the above analyses is the assumption of efficient, cost-
minimizing behavior on the part of public school administrators.  However, public 
schools have considerable monopoly power in local markets, and public school 
administrators operate in a political environment.   Jobs are a reward that school boards 
and superintendents can distribute to purchase votes or otherwise expand political 
influence, which may lead public sector employers to favor more labor intensive 
production.  Union dues income also rises with employment.10   A public choice approach 
seems fruitful, but we are unaware of studies that have developed this line of inquiry 
regarding school staffing ratios.11 
 
4. Comparing Teacher and Non-Teacher Compensation 
 As noted above, many researchers have examined the level and trend of teacher 
and non-teacher earnings (e.g., Hanushek and Rivkin, 1997; Stoddard, 2003;   Allegretto, 
et. al, 2004). Static or dynamic comparisons of salaries or compensation between teachers 
and other professionals present challenges.  The implicit assumption is that the 
remuneration gap, however measured,   is the relevant price for an individual considering 
teaching versus another career.  Yet the differences in some pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
factors between teaching and other careers are large, and may not be stable over time, 
from one cohort to the next, or over a work career.   The most obvious comparability 
problem concerns the much smaller number of annual work hours in teaching as 
compared to other professions.  Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics finds that the 
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work week for teachers (on site) is considerably shorter than that for other professionals 
(37.1 hours for public school teachers versus 40.7 for management occupations in the 
private sector, U.S. Department of Labor, 2008, Tables 4 and 6).   A much bigger 
difference, however, is the annual weeks of work.  The typical teacher contract in the 
U.S. calls for roughly 185 days of work, or only 37-38 annual weeks.   Virtually all other 
professionals (except college professors) have 52 week contracts.   Even adjusting for the 
fact that  other professionals  have paid time off and summer vacations,  annual work 
hours (on site) are much lower for  teachers (Podgursky and Tongrut, 2006).  Data from 
2006 find that annual hours on site for teachers average 1411 versus 2116 for managers – 
a gap of 705 hours annually (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008).  At a minimum, this 
yields major savings on day care for women with young children.12 Moreover, this annual 
hours gap may not have been stable over the longer term either, since the mix of non-
teacher professions constituting the relevant opportunity set for females has shifted over 
time toward more time-intensive professions such as management, medicine, and law, as 
compared to clerks, librarians, and retail sales occupations. 13 
Teaching will tend to attract individuals who value short and predictable hours of 
work on site and long summer vacations.   Women with young children or who plan to 
have children fit that description.  In fact, Census data show that teachers  have more 
(own) children than do other college-educated women in the workforce (Podgursky,  
2003).  Thus, it is not surprising that teaching is a female-dominated occupation and, 
unlike many other professions, increasingly so.   Between 1961 and 2001, the most recent 
national data available in this series, the female share increased from 69 to 79 percent 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2007, Table 69). 
 14 
Taylor (2008) highlights another important factor in often overlooked in 
comparisons of teacher to non-teacher pay.   She conducts an analysis of annual earnings 
gaps between teachers and non-teacher college graduates (with a rough control for annual 
hours of work).   Taylor notes that teachers are spread throughout the country roughly in 
proportion to the population (i.e., wherever there are children).  This contrasts with many 
professions routinely compared to teaching (e.g., medicine, management, engineering, 
accounting, advertising), which are more heavily concentrated in urban areas.  She finds 
that, as compared to other college-educated workers, teachers are more heavily 
concentrated in (low-wage) rural areas.   As a consequence, estimates of teacher-non-
teacher earnings gaps are biased upward if detailed controls for locale type are omitted.   
Taylor reports an 8 percent teacher-non-teacher gap if geographic controls are omitted.  
This falls to just five percent when geographic controls are included.  Unfortunately, she 
includes private school teachers in her definition of “teachers.”  Omitting private school 
teachers would nearly extinguish this gap. 
The discussion above focuses on comparisons of teacher and non-teacher salaries.   
However, fringe benefits account for a large and growing share of professional 
compensation.   Any attempt to understand the effects of compensation on recruitment 
and retention of teachers must take account of current and deferred benefits.  While 
anecdotal evidence suggests that the fringe benefit package for public school teachers is 
relatively more generous than for comparable private sector professionals, until recently 
reliable national data on this issue were lacking.   The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the 
U.S. Department of Labor has for some time been collecting data on employee benefit 
costs as part of its employer-based National Compensation Survey.14  However, only 
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recently have they begun to release some of these data at a level of disaggregation that 
would identify public school teachers.   
Table 1 reports employer contributions for fringe benefits as a percent of earnings 
for teachers and private sector management and professionals.  These are quarterly data 
starting in March, 2004, the first quarter in which BLS released them, to the most recent 
available, March 2009.  The BLS reports these on an hourly basis.   The first thing to note 
is that the hourly pay for managers and professionals is roughly comparable to that of 
teachers.  The major difference in annual salaries arises from a difference in annual hours 
of work.  The BLS reports that the on-site work hours of public K-12 teachers are only 67 
percent those of managers (i.e., 1411 versus 2116 hours).   This hours gap is the primary 
explanation for the earnings gap. 
 Our focus, however, is on fringe benefits as a percent of salary.   The BLS data 
are aggregated into three broad groups:  insurance (primarily health insurance for current 
employees), retirement, and legally required (primarily Social Security).   Comparisons 
of public school teachers and private sector professionals are complicated by the fact that 
roughly 30 percent of teachers are not covered by Social Security.   For these teachers, 
then, legally required contributions are lower.  However, because they are not covered by 
Social Security their public pension plans are more generous (more on this below).   For 
this reason we have combined legally required and employer retirement contributions.   
The key point is that in 2004, the fringe benefit rate for public school teachers was five 
percentage points higher for public school teachers, and by 2009 the gap had widened to 
ten percent.  Thus, fringe benefits as a percent of salary are larger for teachers, and this 
gap has not been stationary, but widening, at least since 2004.15 
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 (Table 1) 
 
4.1.  Public-Private School Comparisons 
In areas other than K-12, public sector personnel managers often use private pay 
and benefits as a benchmark in setting government pay.   In public administration, it is 
commonplace to undertake surveys comparing government and private sector pay.  
Indeed, one important function of compensation data collected by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics is to provide private-sector as well as state and local benchmark data for Federal 
wage-setting.  Since 12 percent of teachers are employed in private schools, one might 
expect private sector compensation data to play a larger role in policy discussions 
concerning the adequacy of public school teacher pay.  The two sectors compete for 
teachers, and mobility between the two is extensive.  Data from the 1999-2000 School 
and Staffing Survey (SASS), national surveys of schools and teachers undertaken at 
regular intervals by the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES), show that 36 percent of full-time private and 13 percent of full-time 
public school teachers report some teaching experience in the other sector (Podgursky, 
2003). 
This cross-sector experience is hardly surprising since there are very few 
occupations or professions in which employment is entirely segmented in one or the other 
sector.  It is not uncommon for many professionals to move from public to private sector 
employment over a work career, or from for-profit to non-profit firms within the private 
sector.   However, in spite of this mobility, comparisons of pay and benefits between 
public and private schools play little role in education policy discussions.  There are 
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legitimate objections to gross public-private teacher pay comparisons.  First, many 
private schools have a religious orientation and are staffed by teachers of the same 
religious denomination.  To the extent that such schools are advancing a religious 
mission, they and their teachers are not comparable to public K-12 schools.  Second, 
private schools are generally more selective in admissions than public schools and, on 
average, have students with higher socioeconomic status.  To the extent this results in 
better-behaved and more academically-motivated students in private school classrooms, it 
makes for a more attractive teaching environment.  However, when religious-oriented 
and special emphasis (e.g., Montessori, special education) schools are eliminated from 
the private school sample, and public school teachers are limited to those in suburban low 
poverty districts, average private school  pay is still well below that of the public schools 
at every level of experience.   Benefit levels for private school teachers are lower as well 
(Podgursky, 2003).  In spite of the lower pay and benefits, academic measures of teacher 
quality as well as principal evaluations are higher in private schools (Ballou and 
Podgursky, 1998). 
 
5.  Teacher Pay and Student Achievement 
An important strand of research on teacher compensation concerns the 
relationship between teacher pay and student performance.   Surveys of the early 
education production function literature found little evidence of a strong positive effect of 
teacher pay on student achievement.  Of 118 estimates reported in the literature, 73 
percent were statistically insignificant, 20 percent were positive and significant, and 7 
percent were negative and significant (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2004).  A subset of “value-
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added,” single state studies had 17 estimates of earnings.  Of these, 82 percent were 
statistically insignificant and 18 percent were positive and significant.  Two recent 
econometric studies of teacher effects cast further doubt on a positive wage effect.  
Jacobs and Lefgren (2005) find no relationship between teacher pay and teacher 
performance in a large urban school district, and Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, and Rivkin, 
(2005) report no relationship between teacher productivity and changes in teacher pay for 
teachers who left a Texas school district.  Contrary evidence is found in Loeb and Page 
(2000), who examine data from multiple Census years aggregated to the state level.  They 
estimate the effect of changes in teacher relative pay on changes in dropout rates and 
college attendance and find significant effects.  They estimate similar difference-in-
difference models for California school districts and get comparable results. 16 
Ballou and Podgursky (1997) explore evidence concerning changes in teacher 
salaries and teacher quality during the 1980’s.   This period brackets the watershed year 
of 1983 in which President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in 
Education issued its provocative report, A Nation at Risk.  The furor in the wake of that 
report set in motion many efforts at education reform, along with substantial increases in 
spending per student and in relative teacher pay.  However, there was wide variation 
across states with regard to pay increases.  While nearly all measures of teacher quality 
rose over this period, these authors find no evidence that states with above average 
increases in teacher pay had above average increases in teacher quality, however 
measured.  They identify a variety of structural factors in teacher labor markets such as 
tenure and single salary schedules, which dampen a quality response.  Ballou (1996) 
finds no evidence that teachers with stronger academic credentials such as in-field majors 
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or graduation from a selective college are favored in employer hiring decisions.17 Ballou 
and Podgursky (1995, 1997) show that this weak return to quality, combined with other 
structural rigidities in the market for public school teachers, may actually discourage 
candidates from entering job queues in response to across-the-board pay increases.18  
Simulations over a wide range of parameters suggests that the quality elasticity of across-
the-board pay increases, given such poor screening by employers, will be very low and 
possibly even negative.   
 
6.  The Structure of Teacher Compensation 
6.1  Institutional Framework: The Single Salary Schedule 
Salary schedules for teachers are a nearly universal feature of public school 
districts.  Pay for teachers in public school districts is largely determined by these 
schedules.  In large school districts the pay of thousands of teachers in hundreds of 
schools -- from kindergarten up to secondary teachers in math and science -- is set by a 
single district schedule. The nearly universal use of salary schedules in public school 
districts is seen in data from the 1999-00 SASS.  Ninety-six percent of public school 
districts accounting for nearly one hundred percent of teachers report use of a salary 
schedule (Podgursky, 2007).  
Table 2 provides an example of a salary schedule, in this case for Columbus, Ohio 
public school teachers.  The rows and columns refer to years of experience and levels of 
teacher education, respectively.  The pay increases associated with higher levels of 
education may be for training not associated with a teacher’s actual classroom 
assignments.   For example, it is not uncommon for teachers to earn remuneration for 
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graduate credits and degrees in education administration while they are still employed 
full time as classroom teachers. 
(Table 2) 
 These teacher salary schedules are sometimes referred to as “single salary 
schedules, ”  a term reflecting their historical development.  Kershaw and McKean 
(1962) note that there were three phases in the historical development of teacher pay 
regimes.  The first phase, which lasted roughly until the beginning of the 20th century, 
saw teacher pay negotiated between an individual teacher and a local school board.  As 
school districts consolidated and grew in size, this type of salary determination became 
increasingly unpopular with teachers.  With consolidation and growth, the monopoly 
power of school districts in the labor market increased, and charges of favoritism were 
common.  In response to these concerns, there was gradual movement toward the use of 
salary schedules that differed by grade level and position.  "Typically the salaries differed 
from grade to grade, and high school salaries would inevitably be higher than those at the 
elementary level." (Kershaw and McKean, 1962, p. 22).   
 The third and current phase began in the 1920's and accelerated in WWII and the 
immediate post-war period.  This is characterized by what is termed the "single salary 
schedule" -- the current norm.  An education commentator writing in the 1950's noted 
that "the distinguishing characteristic of the single salary schedule is that the salary class 
to which the classroom teacher is assigned depends on the professional qualifications of 
the teacher rather than the school level or assignment."  Kershaw and McKean write, 
"The single salary schedule was regarded as bringing a feeling of contentment and 
professionalism.  A teacher would no longer be an elementary teacher, but a teacher, a 
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member on equal footing of the profession that included all teachers.” By 1951, 98 
percent of urban school districts employed the single salary schedule (Kershaw and 
McKean, 1962, pp. 23, 25.  See also, Lieberman, 1956, pp. 391-393). 
Since elementary school teachers were nearly all women whereas high school 
teachers were largely male, early struggles for a single salary schedule were seen by 
some commentators as an important part of feminist struggles for pay equity (Murphy, 
1990). Eventually, the unification of schedules for elementary and secondary school 
teachers was embraced by the National Education Association as well as the American 
Federation of Teachers and embedded in collective bargaining agreements and, in some 
cases, state legislation. 
 These salary schedules for teachers contrast with the situation in most other 
professions.  In medicine, pay of doctors and nurses varies by specialty.  Even within the 
same hospital or HMO, pay will differ by specialty field.  In higher education there are 
large differences in pay between faculty by teaching fields.   Faculty pay structures in 
most higher education institutions are flexible.  Starting pay is usually market-driven, and 
institutions will often match counter-offers for more senior faculty whom they wish to 
retain.  Merit or performance-based pay is commonplace.  Ballou and Podgursky (1997) 
and Ballou (2001) report generally similar findings for private K-12 education.  Even 
when private schools report that they use a salary schedule for teacher pay, payments "off 
schedule" seem commonplace.19   
 Rigid salary schedules might have some efficiency rationale if the factors 
rewarded,  teacher experience and graduate education,  were strong predictors of teacher 
productivity.  However, surveys of the education production literature find no support for 
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a positive effect of teacher graduate degrees.  Hanushek (2003) reports that, of 41 “value-
added” estimates of the effect of education levels on teacher effectiveness (primarily 
Master’s degrees), not a single study found a statistically significant positive effect.  In 
fact, ten of the studies found negative effects.  Furthermore, teacher experience has little 
effect beyond the first few years (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2004).    
If wages are not allowed to clear the labor market, then the market will clear in 
other ways (“You can’t repeal the law of supply and demand.”)  We now consider some 
consequences of teacher salary schedules.  First, the single salary schedule suppresses 
pay differentials by field.  All teachers in a district with the same experience or education 
level earn the same base pay.  Thus, a second grade teacher will earn the same pay as a 
high school chemistry teacher.   Given the major differences in human capital 
investments by teaching field (e.g., elementary education versus secondary physical 
science) it is almost certainly the case that non-teaching opportunity earnings differ 
greatly as well.   
 National data on teacher recruiting in Table 3 bear this out.  These data are from 
the 1999-00 and 2003-04 SASS, .  These are assessments of market conditions by 
administrators who have recently recruited teachers in these fields.  Respondents were 
asked to rate how difficult or easy it was to fill a vacancy in the field.   In 2003-04, 75 
percent of school administrators reported that it was “easy” to fill vacancies in 
elementary education, with fewer than four percent reporting it “very difficult” or that 
they could not fill the position.   The situation changes dramatically when we turn to 
math, science, and special education, where a large share of districts reported it was “very 
difficult” or they were unable to fill a vacancy.   Data in Table 4 show that this pattern 
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also prevailed even in high poverty schools.  While low poverty schools reported greater 
ease in recruiting, nonetheless 63 percent of high poverty schools reported it easy to fill 
vacancies in elementary education.20 
(Tables 3 and 4) 
In a market with flexible wages, earnings of elementary teachers would fall 
relative to science, math, and special education teachers.  However, district salary 
schedules do not permit this relative wage adjustment to occur.  Thus, the market “clears” 
in terms of quality rather than price.   Numerous reports have documented the extent of 
“teaching out of field,” or teachers practicing with substandard licenses in the fields of 
science, math, and special education, while over 95 percent of elementary school teachers 
are fully licensed in elementary education (U.S. Department of Education, 2004b).   
Policy makers and researchers tend to treat K-12 teachers as a single occupation.  
From a labor market perspective, this is probably not a very useful aggregation. The 
training, working conditions, and non-teaching opportunities of a second grade teacher 
are very different from those of a high school chemistry teacher.   Yet, for purposes of 
policy and in many research studies they are grouped into a single occupation – teachers.  
This is abetted in part by the collective bargaining process, which puts all teachers in a 
school district, regardless of the level of school or teaching field, into a single 
“bargaining unit.”   However, single salary schedules are the norm even in non-
bargaining states.  
A second problem with the single salary schedule is that it suppresses differentials 
by schools within districts.  In larger urban districts dozens or even hundreds of schools 
are covered by the same salary schedule.  The working environments for teachers often 
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vary greatly between these schools.  Some may even be dangerous places to work, 
whereas other schools are more pleasant and attractive worksites.  Often teachers in the 
less desirable schools will be able to use their seniority to transfer to a more pleasant 
school,  or they may simply quit at a higher rate.   In either case, the result is that students 
in high poverty schools will on average have less experienced (and less educated) 
teachers.   Because the salary schedule assigns lower pay to teachers with less experience 
within a school district,  an unintended consequence of a district-wide salary schedule is 
lower spending per student in high-poverty schools (Roza, et.al, 2007;  Iatarola and 
Stiefel, 2003).   High poverty schools will also have relatively more novice or 
inexperienced teachers.  One fairly consistent finding in the “teacher effects” literature is 
that students taught by novice or inexperienced teachers have lower achievement gains 
than students with more experienced teachers (e.g., Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, and 2005; 
Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander, 2007; Boyd, et.al., 2006).  Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 
( 2002 ) examine the allocation of teachers in New York City and find that children in 
high poverty schools are more likely to be exposed to novice teachers.   Again, this is an 
intra-NYC allocation problem – one that is clearly exacerbated by a uniform salary 
schedule across all schools.  Podgursky (2008) examines an administrative data set with 
the universe of public elementary schools in Missouri.   He finds that children in high 
poverty schools are more likely to be exposed to novice teachers, but this is entirely due 
to the intra-district allocation of teachers.   To return to our market-clearing thesis, if the 
attractiveness of working conditions varies among schools within a district, then 
equalizing teacher pay disequalizes teacher quality.  In order to equalize teacher quality, 
one needs to disequalize teacher pay. 
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 A final consequence of single salary schedules is the equalization of pay 
regardless of teacher effectiveness.  A consistent finding in the teacher value-added 
literature is that there is a very large variation in teacher effectiveness (e.g., Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Aaronson, Barnow, and Sander, 2007).  Even within the same 
school building, some fourth grade teachers are much more effective at raising student 
achievement than other fourth grade teachers.  Some teachers are harder working and 
elicit greater effort from students than others.  Some teachers may be “burnt out” and 
simply putting in time until retirement (more on pension system incentives below).   The 
single salary schedule suppresses differences between more effective and less effective 
teachers (however defined).  Rewarding more effective teachers on the basis of 
performance would have two important consequences.  The first is a motivation effect.  
Incumbent teachers would have an incentive to work harder to raise whatever 
performance measure is rewarded.  In addition, over the longer term, performance pay 
would have a selection effect.  It would draw teachers into the workforce who are 
relatively more effective at meeting the performance targets and would help retain such 
teachers as well (Podgursky and Springer, 2007).   Equalizing teacher pay among 
teachers of different effectiveness lowers the overall quality and performance of the 
teaching workforce.   
 
6.2  Confounding Factors:  Tenure and the Size of Wage-Setting Units 
 The costs associated with teacher salary schedules are exacerbated by two other 
features of K-12 human resource policy:  tenure and the size of wage-setting units (i.e., 
districts).  Consider first the effect of teacher tenure.  Even if experience per se does not 
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raise a teacher’s effectiveness, in principle a seniority-based wage structure might be 
efficient if less effective teachers are weeded out over time through contract non-renewal. 
However, personnel policies in traditional public schools are not likely to produce such 
an effect.  Teachers in traditional public school districts receive automatic contract 
renewal (tenure) after two to five years on the job.  After receiving tenure, it is very 
difficult to dismiss a teacher for poor job performance, a finding which has been widely 
documented (Bridges, 1992; Hess and West, 2006).  Thus, the presence of teacher tenure 
laws and collective bargaining language, which further hampers dismissal of low-
performing teachers, makes the economic costs associated with single salary schedules 
even greater. 
Another factor that increases the cost of rigid district salary schedules is the size 
of wage-setting units.  Other things equal, the larger the size of the unit, the greater the 
economic cost of rigid salary schedules.  The wage-setting unit in private and charter 
schools is typically the school, whereas in traditional public schools wage-setting is at the 
district level.  In fact, most personnel policy concerning teachers – the level and structure 
of teacher pay, benefits, and recruiting  – is centralized at the district level in traditional 
public schools.  This policy has two effects.  First, it makes the market for teachers less 
flexible and less competitive.  Rather than ten “districts” each setting pay for ten schools, 
a single employer sets pay for one hundred schools.  At least the ten smaller districts 
could compete with one another and adjust their schedules to meet their own internal 
circumstances.  A second consequence of  large wage setting-units is that the wage-
setting process becomes more bureaucratic and less amenable to merit or market 
adjustments (Podgursky, 2007).  Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic differences in the size 
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of the wage and personnel units in traditional public and private schools.  There are 
approximately 15,000 public school districts in the U.S. However, the size distribution of 
these districts in terms of teacher employment is very highly skewed.   As a consequence, 
most teachers are employed in large school districts.  One quarter of teachers in 
traditional public schools are employed in districts with at least 2100 full-time equivalent 
(FTE) teachers, and half of traditional public school teachers are in districts with at least 
561 FTE teachers.  Thus, the typical teacher finds herself in a large organization with 
standardized, bureaucratic wage-setting.  By contrast, the average charter school – an 
independent employer -- employs just 16 FTE teachers, barely larger than the average 
private school (15 FTE’s).   
(Figure 2) 
In principle, public school districts need not be so bureaucratic.  They could adopt 
more decentralized systems of personnel policy, give school principals more control over 
teacher recruitment and pay, and adopt more of a team model.  The fact that one observes 
wage-setting in private schools, including Catholic dioceses, following a more 
decentralized model suggests that there are few efficiency gains to be had from 
centralization of compensation.  However, this highlights an important difference 
between traditional public and charter or private schools.  The percent of teachers 
covered by collective bargaining agreements in charter schools is far lower than in 
traditional public schools; for private schools, it is virtually nil.  Tabulations from the 
1999-00 Schools and Staffing Surveys find that seventy percent of public school districts, 
employing 73 percent of teachers, have collective bargaining agreements covering their 
teachers.  This contrasts with just 14 percent of charter schools (employing 18 percent of 
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charter school teachers).21   The absence of a binding collective bargaining agreement is 
an important source of personnel flexibility in private and charter schools.  Teacher 
unions in general have been opposed to more flexible market or performance-based pay 
systems, although there are exceptions such as the widely-publicized Denver 
performance play plan.  However, even in Denver, the plan is district-wide and not 
school-based (Podgursky and Springer, 2007).   Collective bargaining laws, by defining 
the district as the “appropriate bargaining unit,” have tended to push personnel policy and 
wage-setting to the district level and lock them there. 
These types of salary schedules seem to be the norm in most OECD countries.   
However, some differences are apparent.   It is not uncommon for secondary teachers to 
be on separate and higher salary schedules than primary teachers (Sclafani and Tucker, 
2006).  Another interesting effect arises as a consequence of the importance of rigorous 
high-stakes exams for college and high school placement.   Some Asian countries have 
seen the development of a private, after school market in test preparation.  The most 
widely discussed is Japan, which has a private system of “juku” schools.  Hagwon 
schools in South Korea are a similar phenomenon.  While we are unaware of any 
systematic data on this, anecdotal evidence suggests that these schools are heavily staffed 
by moonlighting public school teachers.  We do know that parents spend a good deal of 
money on them. Thus, while the public system has wages set bureaucratically, the private 
test-prep market is competitive and will likely tend to reward the most effective teachers 
in the key tested areas.  Public school teachers and college students, contemplating their 
teaching and non-teaching options, will presumably take account of potential 
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remuneration in these after school markets as part of their teaching compensation 
package.22 
 
6.3  Deferred Compensation:  Teacher Pension Incentives 
Pensions have long been an important part of compensation for teachers in public 
schools.   Traditionally, it has been argued, salaries have been relatively low, while 
pension benefits have been relatively high for teachers and others who spend their career 
in public service.   This mix of current versus deferred income was rationalized by the 
contention that the public good was best served by the longevity of service that would be 
induced by these pension plans.23  In recent decades, however, evidence has grown that 
many of these plans, both in the private and public sector, may actually have shortened 
rather than lengthened professional careers by encouraging early retirements.24 
The cost side of teacher retirement benefits affects labor markets by driving a 
wedge between the amount paid by employers and the take-home pay received by 
teachers.   In Ohio, for example, the combined contributions of teachers and school 
districts for retirement benefits have risen steadily from 10 percent in 1945 to 24 percent 
today.  But even this large wedge falls well short of what is needed, and pension officials 
are recommending a phased increase to 29 percent to shore up funding for pensions and 
retiree health benefits.  At this level, retiree benefits for teachers and other professionals 
would be consuming well over $1,000 of the annual per student expenditures (Costrell 
and Podgursky, 2007).   The costs of school retiree benefits (including "legacy" costs 
from unfunded benefits for previous retirees) consume a growing share of K-12 spending.  
Figure 3 reports employer costs for retirement and Social Security for teachers and 
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private sector managers and professionals based on BLS benefit data discussed earlier.  
The gap in retirement benefit costs as a percent of salaries widened from 1.9 to 5.1 
percent of earnings between 2004 and 2009.   However, this understates the actual gap 
since the BLS data do not include employer contributions for retiree health insurance, 
which are substantial in some states and districts, but have all but disappeared in the 
private sector. 25 
(Figure 3) 
An important research question is the effect of these retirement benefits systems 
on the teaching workforce.   Costrell and Podgursky (2009a) show that the pattern of 
pension wealth accrual in teacher defined benefit systems creates strong incentives to pull 
teachers to a given age and then push them out of the workforce afterward, with the push 
encouraging teachers to retire at relatively early ages by economy wide standards.  Figure 
4 illustrates this point for a hypothetical female teacher who enters the profession at age 
25 and teaches continuously in California.26   The employer contribution rate is 12.77 
percent, yet for most of a teacher’s career, her annual accrual of pension wealth is below 
that.  However, in certain years, the accrual of pension wealth has very sharp spikes.  
These are usually associated with earlier eligibility for regular benefits. For example, in 
the case of California, during her first 29 years on the job (up to age 54), on separation 
she would be unable to collect her pension until age 57.   However, upon completion of 
her 30th year on the job (age 55) she can begin collecting the pension immediately.   
Thus, the spike in pension wealth largely reflects the discounted value of two additional 
years of pension annuities.  There is nothing unique about California.   Costrell and 
Podgursky (2009b) show that these spikes exist in other teacher DB plans. 
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(Figure 4) 
These pension systems also impose very large costs on mobile teachers.  Costrell 
and Podgursky (2009a) consider the mobility costs of teacher pension systems in six state 
teacher pension systems.  They show that teachers who work a full career in teaching but 
who transfer between systems (“movers”) suffer huge losses of pension wealth as 
compared to “stayers.”  In their simulations, teachers who split a 30 year career evenly 
between two otherwise identical pension systems typically lose one half or more of their 
pension wealth as compared to an otherwise identical 30-year stayer. 
It is difficult to discern an efficiency rationale for these spikes in pension wealth 
accrual.  The fairly massive backloading of benefits might be justified if there were 
evidence of large returns to experience and important job specific human capital 
investments.  However, the majority of value-added econometric studies of teacher 
effectiveness find that novice teachers (e.g., teachers with less than three years of 
experience) on average are less effective than more senior teachers, but thereafter the 
returns to experience level off quickly.   There is little evidence that a teacher with twenty 
years experience is any more effective in the classroom than a teacher with ten years 
experience.  Ironically, the current pension system, by pushing many teachers into 
retirement at relatively young ages, actually raises the steady-state share of novice 
teachers in the workforce and thus lowers overall teacher effectiveness.  
Do these pension incentives and penalties affect teacher behavior?   A substantial 
literature in labor economics demonstrates that the incentives in pension systems matter, 
not only for the timing of retirement, but for labor turnover and workforce quality 
(Friedberg and Webb, 2005; Asch, Haider, and Zissimopoulos, 2005; Ippolito, 1997; 
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Stock and Wise, 1990).  Unfortunately, little of this literature pertains to teachers.  While 
there have been many studies of the effect of current compensation on teacher turnover 
(e.g., Murnane and Olsen, 1990; Stinebrickner, 2001; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 2004; 
Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson, 2004), the econometric literature on teacher pensions is 
slender but expanding.  Several papers find that the structure of teacher pension wealth 
accrual affects the timing of teacher retirement behavior (Ferguson, et. al. (2006), Brown, 
2009; Costrell and McGee, 2009).   Costrell and McGee (2009) use their model to 
explore what effect a smoother pension wealth accrual system (such as a defined 
contribution or cash balance plan)  would have on teacher retirement.   They find that 
smoother accrual would delay teacher retirement. 
 
7.  Trends in Market-Based Pay 
 
 Given the efficiency costs of rigid salary schedules described above and growing 
pressure on schools to raise performance, it is not surprising that interest in market and 
performance-based pay is growing.   Several states and districts have implemented 
incentives to encourage experienced educators to teach in low performing schools 
(Prince, 2002).  Florida, Minnesota, and Texas have implemented state programs to 
encourage schools and districts to implement performance based pay systems for 
teachers.   Congress has also provided an impetus through its Teacher Incentive Fund 
(TIF), a two year, $200 million program to encourage states to set up pilot programs of 
teacher performance incentives (Podgursky and Springer, 2007).   The administration has 
proposed another $200 million expansion in TIF in its current budget.   Perhaps more 
importantly, implementation of performance pay is encouraged in “Race to the Top” state 
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applications, wherein states compete for $4 billion in total awards for broad based school 
reform initiatives (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  
 The web site of the National Center for Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt 
University tracks programs by state.  Unfortunately, we do not have much 
“microeconomic” data on the actual implementation of these programs in schools, and 
state data systems generally do not capture these program details.  Even states that have 
good data on teacher salaries and their components generally cannot break out teacher 
performance or incentive bonuses. 
 The best data currently available on national levels and trends is to be found in 
various waves of the Schools and Staffing Surveys (SASS).  SASS is a large nationally 
representative sample of roughly 8000 public schools and 43,000 public school 
teachers.27  There have been five waves of SASS, associated with five school years:  
1987-88, 1990-91, 1994-95, 1999-00, and 2003-04.  While SASS covers two decades of 
public school experience and has included various questions about performance and 
market-based pay, unfortunately, many of these survey questions have not been 
comparable over time.  Thus, we focus attention on data in the most recent waves of the 
survey, which contain consistent items. 
 District administrators were asked whether they provided pay bonuses or other 
rewards for certain teacher characteristics or behaviors.28  These are listed in the top rows 
of Table 5.  The most common bonus is for professional development.  In 2003-04, 36 
percent of teachers were offered such a bonus.  The next most common bonus among 
districts is NBPTS certification.  In 2003-04, 18 percent of districts, accounting for 40 
percent of teachers, offered some sort of bonus for NBPTS certification.  This is also the 
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most rapidly growing bonus, with the number of districts offering it growing by ten 
percentage points between the 1999-00 and 2003-04 surveys.   
(Table 5) 
 Eight percent of districts, accounting for 14 percent of teachers, reported rewards 
for excellence in teaching.  In 2003-04, five percent of districts (13 percent of teachers) 
had bonuses for teaching in a less desirable location, and 12 percent of districts (25 
percent of teachers) reported bonuses of some sort for teaching in shortage fields.29  
 Table 5 also reports the number of incentives provided.  Fifty five percent of 
districts (31 percent of teachers) provided no incentive rewards.  This share has dropped 
between the 1999-00 and 2003-04 surveys.  Two-thirds of teachers are employed in 
districts that provide one or more such incentives, and 15 percent of teachers are in 
districts providing three or more such incentives.   
 The first block of questions in Table 5 focused on individual teacher bonuses.  
The next block of questions at the bottom of the table concerns school-wide bonuses.  
Some states and districts have begun to provide school-wide incentives for staff.  
Unfortunately, these questions were only asked in the 2003-04 survey. Of most interest 
for our purposes is the question concerning cash payments to teachers.  Five percent of 
districts (15 percent of teachers) report cash bonuses or additional resources based on 
student achievement. 
 While all of the SASS surveys had questions on market and performance-based 
pay, few of the questions were consistently asked from one administration of the survey 
to the next.  One block of questions that was nearly identical over the years concerned 
recruitment bonuses by field.  This question asked district administrators whether they 
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offered additional rewards in shortage fields, and in which teaching fields they are used.   
The results are presented in Table 6. 
(Table 6) 
 First, it is worth noting the sharp increase over the 16 year interval in the 
incidence of field-based incentives.  In the first administration of SASS during the 1987-
88 school year, only 7.5 percent of districts (11.3 percent of teachers) provided such 
incentives.30  That share climbed to 12 percent of districts employing 25 percent of 
teachers by the 2003-04 school year.  Consistent with the recruitment difficulty responses 
seen in Table 3, these recruitment incentives are most commonly used in the areas of 
special education, math, science, and English as a second language.   
 While similar quantitative survey data are lacking, available evidence suggests 
that government experiments in performance pay are growing in other developed nations 
as well (Sclafani and Tucker, 2006; Springer and Balch, 2009). 
  
8.  Teacher Collective Bargaining 
Public school teachers, like state and local employees, generally are not covered 
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the legislation that regulates private sector 
collective bargaining in the United States.  States have the option of permitting 
bargaining or not and setting the regulatory framework within which it occurs.   In 
general, teacher collective bargaining largely followed the trend of public employee 
bargaining.  In 1962 Wisconsin passed the first NLRA-type bargaining law for public 
employees (including teachers).   Within the next five years, New York and Michigan 
passed similar laws.   By 1974, 37 states had such bargaining laws.   In 1974 roughly 22 
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percent of public school teachers were covered by collective bargaining agreements.   
That grew from over 60 percent by the mid-80’s to 67 percent currently (Farber, 2006).    
The institutional landscape changed dramatically as well.  Prior to 1960, the 
National Education Association was a professional association dominated by school 
administrators.  Its ranks also included higher education faculty and administrators.  It 
opposed collective bargaining and did not consider itself part of the labor movement (it 
was not then and has never been affiliated with the AFL-CIO).   The American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT), the other major teacher organization,  had a trade union 
ideology, was part of the AFL-CIO, and actively sought to advance teacher collective 
bargaining.   The base of strength for the AFT was (and is) in large urban school districts.   
However, as the AFT rode a wave of labor militancy and strikes during the 1960’s to 
organize more and more schools, the NEA gradually shed its opposition to collective 
bargaining, as well as its school administrator membership, and effectively began 
competing with the AFT as a union.  Along with teachers, both the NEA and AFT have 
thousands of K-12 school support personnel in their membership as well.31 
Especially in larger school districts, both of these unions negotiate long and 
complex agreements that specify in detail not only what teachers will be paid, but also 
how staffing assignments will be made, the length of the work day and year, duty free 
lunches, minutes of meetings or professional development time, how vacancies will be 
filled, maximum class sizes, and many other details about resource allocation in 
schools.32 Furthermore, the due process procedures in the contract, combined with state 
statutes on teacher tenure, often make it very difficult to dismiss poor performing 
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teachers.  Simple observation thus leads many observers to expect teacher collective 
bargaining to raise school costs and lower school productivity. 
On the other hand, some observers note that many school managers are highly 
inefficient even in the absence of unions.  Teacher unions, it is argued, can bring 
professionalism to a work environment in which it is often lacking.   By providing greater 
worker “voice,” unions  may improve teacher productivity (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).   
Which of these effects dominates is an empirical point. 
  The episodic and clustered nature of the unionization process poses challenges 
for assessing its effect on teacher wages and school performance.   In the interest of 
brevity, we will use the term “union teacher” to refer to a teacher whose terms of 
employment are determined by a union negotiated contract, and a “non-union teacher,” 
one who is not.   Currently, non-union teachers are primarily located in states that have 
not passed collective bargaining laws.  The growth of teacher unionization in the U.S. 
was not smooth and incremental.  Rather, it was characterized by episodic jumps in 
membership associated with state passage of such laws.   The structure has stabilized now 
such that non-bargaining states are primarily located in the south.      
Several papers have estimated cross-section models of teacher union effects on 
pay and student achievement (Baugh and Stone, 1982; Eberts and Stone, 1984).  Broadly, 
these studies find that unionization is associated with higher spending per student and 
teacher pay, and very modest increases in student achievement.  However, it is difficult to 
have much confidence that these cross-section estimates identify  causal effects of 
unions.   There are two sources of cross-section variation in the union “treatment” – 
within and between state variation.   In both cases, it is very likely that there are omitted 
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variables associated with teacher unionism and the outcome variables of interest (i.e., 
spending and student achievement).   First, non-union districts within a bargaining state 
have some characteristic (unmeasured) that has kept them non-union – good labor 
management relations is one obvious candidate.  These management skills can readily 
spill over to teacher quality and student achievement.   Moreover, management may act 
in ways to pre-empt  unionization, perhaps by raising pay.   In the labor economics 
literature this is called a “threat effect”  (Rosen, 1969).    
Cross-state variation in unionization is also a problem.   Most of the cross section 
variation in teacher unionization arises from differences in the legislative environment 
across states.   Some states, like Texas, make collective bargaining illegal; others, like 
Ohio, mandate it.  Thus, a cross section achievement on unionization regression 
essentially becomes a regression on regions – students in southern states on average have 
lower achievement and their teachers are less likely to be unionized.   
A more ambitious approach to estimating teacher union effects that attempts to 
address the problems of endogenieity and omitted variables is Hoxby (1996), who 
examines the effect of teacher collective bargaining on spending, school inputs, and 
school performance.   Hoxby builds a large  panel data set of school districts including 
teacher unionization information from 1972, 82, and 92 Census of Governments along 
with district data from several other sources.   She addresses the endogeniety problem in 
two ways.  First, she estimates difference-in-difference models on the input, spending and 
performance variables.   Second, she uses an IV for the change in unionism, using the 
passage of state collective bargaining laws as her instrument.    She finds that unionism 
does, in fact, increase spending per student.  Her estimated effect is 9.5 percent.   Most of 
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this increase goes to teacher salaries and a reduction in the student- teacher ratio.   
However, she also finds that collective bargaining reduces the productivity of these 
school inputs.   The net effect is to lower school performance (as measured by dropout 
rates).   She finds that the effects of teacher unions in raising inputs and lowering 
performance are more potent in metropolitan markets that are more competitive (with 
more school districts) than those that are more concentrated, which suggests that 
consumer residential choice can act as a check on union power. 
Unquestionably,  Hoxby (1996) has been the most widely cited study on teacher 
union effects.  However, a recent study by Lovenheim (2009) argues that classification 
error in the measure of collective bargaining may be responsible for Hoxby’s findings.   
Rather than using unionization measures from the Census of Governments, Lovenheim 
uses “hand collected” union election data from three mid-western states (Indiana, Iowa, 
Minnesota -- chosen because they passed strong teacher collective bargaining laws in the 
1970’s).   His data suggest that there are significant classification errors as compared to 
Census of Governments data for these three states.   Given data on the timing of 
unionization by districts, he conducts an event history analysis, comparing the pre and 
post trends in the unionized districts.   Unlike Hoxby, he finds little evidence that unions 
raise teacher pay or otherwise increase school spending.   He finds no evidence that the 
teacher unions in his sample lower school productivity.   He finds some weak results 
suggesting a positive union effect on the efficacy of student- teacher ratios.33  On the 
whole, he finds little teacher union effect on outcomes or resource use. 
While the U.S. literature on teacher unions and school performance is slender, we 
could find almost no literature on this topic for other developed or developing countries.   
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Kingdon and Teal (2008) estimate the effect of teacher union membership on pay and 
student performance in a sample of secondary schools in India.   While the study is cross-
section, they make use of the fact that the same student takes multiple tests and estimate a 
student fixed effect model.  By construction, this model identifies a union-non-union 
differential by teacher within the same school.  They find a positive student effect in three 
of five subjects. (Whether this results from the fact that better teachers join unions or 
union membership raises teacher effectiveness cannot be ascertained.)   This paper 
addresses a different issue from the question in the U.S. literature, which focuses on a 
school-wide union effect.   
Some recent studies have examined the effect of teacher unions on the structure of 
earnings.  Ballou and Podgursky (2001) examine the effect of teacher unions on the 
structure of teacher pay schedules.   They find that pay schedules in unionized districts 
tend to be more backloaded (i.e., higher ratio of peak to starting pay) and more 
compressed (fewer years to hit peak).  They also find evidence that backloading is higher 
in districts with an older teaching workforce whether or not the workforce is unionized.   
Goldhaber, et. al. (2005) examine the effect of teacher unions on district use of various 
types of performance pay in several waves of the Schools and Staffing Surveys.  They 
distinguish two competing hypotheses about performance pay and teaching.  A “nature of 
teaching” thesis, most closely associated with Murnane and Cohen (1986), holds that 
performance pay is unsuited to K-12  teaching, whereas a “political cost” thesis, 
associated with Ballou (2001), holds that there is nothing inherent in teaching that 
precludes performance pay.   The primary impediment is political opposition – largely 
from teacher unions.   The Goldhaber, et.al. evidence favors the “political cost” thesis.34 
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  Koski and Horng (2007) is a cross-section study of the effect of union contract 
language on hiring and transfer on the concentration of low experience or poorly 
credentialed teachers in high poverty schools.   They estimate their model on a sample of 
schools  from California school districts from which they obtained contracts.   The 
hypothesis tested is whether strong contract language facilitates the transfer of teachers 
away from high poverty schools within a district.   They find no evidence that this is the 
case. 
One as yet unexplored area of evidence for teacher union effects is charter 
schools.  The union-non-union landscape for traditional public schools in the U.S. has 
been stable for decades.  Charter schools are another story.   There are currently roughly 
5000 charter schools in operation enrolling 1.5 million students.35   The vast majority of 
charter schools begin life non-union. However, teacher unions have succeeded in 
organizing some of them.  If that trend continues, there may be opportunities for school 
level studies of union effects.36 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
  Human resource (HR) policy – the recruitment, retention, and motivation of 
employees -- is increasingly recognized as a critical variable to the success of an 
organization.  An integrated and coherent compensation policy is the  central core of an 
efficient HR policy.   In private and many public organizations, the compensation 
package is considered as a strategic whole and carefully designed to get the most HR 
return per dollar of compensation.  By contrast, the compensation “system” in public K-
12 education is much more fragmented and uncoordinated, with each piece perhaps 
responding to pressures from a particular constituency or inherited from an earlier 
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collective bargaining agreement, but without systematic consideration of the logic or 
incentive effects of the whole.   
 Accountability pressures are forcing school districts to address the inefficiencies 
in this compensation system and rethink how they are spending roughly $250 billion 
annually for compensation of instructional personnel.  Federal programs in the U.S. such 
as the Teacher Incentive Fund are encouraging states to experiment with performance and 
market-based pay.  States such as Minnesota, Florida, and Texas have developed 
programs to encourage their districts to develop such programs.  A number of large urban 
districts, most notably Denver, have taken important steps in this direction.   Performance 
and market-based incentives are much more common in charter schools and are 
expanding with the charter school base.  Our examination of various waves of SASS find 
some evidence of growth in performance and market-based pay reform even among 
traditional public schools.   Much less movement has occurred in the area of teacher 
pensions, and large unfunded liabilities for pensions and retiree benefits are likely to 
force reforms in this area as well. 
 Experience from the private sector and other government employment suggest 
that much trial and error, hopefully combined with evaluation, will be necessary to arrive 
at effective and workable systems.   However, it is important for education authorities to 
create “regulatory space” within which these compensation reform experiments can be 
carried out and studied. 
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Figure 1 
 
Student Enrollment, Teacher and Non-Teacher Employment in U.S. Public Schools:    Fall, 1980 
to Fall, 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Source:   U.S. Department of Education. National Center on Education Statistics.  Digest of 
Education Statistics.  Various years  
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Figure 2 
 
Size of Wage-Setting Units in Traditional Public, Charter, and Private Schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Podgursky (2007) 
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Figure 3:   
 
Employer contribution to public teacher and private professional retirement and Social 
Security as a percent of salary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Costrell and Podgursky (2009c), updated.  
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Figure 4 
 
Deferred income per year as a percent of salary:  California public school teachers 
(Addition to pension wealth from an additional year of teaching) 
 
 
 
 
Age at Separation (Entry Age = 25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:   Costrell and Podgursky (2009a)  
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Table 1 
     
    
     
 March 2004 Teachers 
 
Mgmt & 
Prof. 
 
 
$ / hr % $ / hr % 
Salary  $35.92 100.00 $33.40 100.00 
Insurance $4.08 11.36 $2.43 7.28 
Retirement and Legally Required  $4.99 13.89 $4.34 12.99 
Total Benefits $9.07 25.25 $6.77 20.27 
      March 2009 
    
 
$ / hr % $ / hr % 
Salary $39.75 100.00 $40.30 100.00 
Insurance  $5.77 14.52 $3.18 7.89 
Retirement and Legally Required  $6.89 17.33 $5.32 13.20 
Total Benefits $12.66 31.85 $8.50 21.09 
      
 
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor.  Bureau of Labor Statistics.  2009, 2004  
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Table 2 
 
2007-08 Salary Schedule for Columbus, Ohio Public School Teachers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  http://www.ceaohio.org/staticDocs/CEA_Master_Agreement_071121.pdf 
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Table 3 
 
Recruitment Difficulties by Teaching Field 
 
 
 How Easy was it to fill the vacancy? 
 
1999-00 
Easy Somewhat  
Difficult 
Very Difficult Could Not Fill 
Elementary 67.6 % 26.2 % 5.5 % .7 % 
Social Studies 70.0 24.7 4.7 .6 
ELA 56.5 33.2 9.5 .8 
Math 29.0 34.8 33.3 2.8 
Biological Sci. 34.0 38.5 26.2 1.3 
Phys. Sci 31.7 35.7 30.2 2.4 
Spec. Ed. 25.5 35.8 32.8 5.8 
 
2003-04 
    
Elementary 75.1 21.1 3.3 .5 
Social Studies 71.5 24.4 3.6 .4 
ELA 59.0 32.9 7.1 1.1 
Math 33.3 37.8 25.5 3.4 
Biological Sci. 34.9 44.2 19.0 1.9 
Phys. Sci 34.6 37.7 25.3 2.4 
Spec. Ed. 29.1 41.8 25.7 3.5 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Schools and Staffing Surveys, various years.  
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Table 4 
 
Recruitment Difficulties by Teaching Field in High and Low Poverty Schools 
 
 
 
 
 
2003-04 
Easy Somewhat  
Difficult 
Very Difficult Could Not Fill 
Elementary     
Low Poverty 
(bottom 25%) 
85.4 % 13.0 % 1.4 % .2 % 
High Poverty  
(top 25%) 
62.7 29.0 6.9 1.4 
Math     
Low Poverty 
(bottom 25%) 
37.4 40.1 21.6 1.4 
High Poverty 
(top 25 %) 
31.1 29.4 32.5 7.1 
 
 
 
Source:  2003-04 Schools and Staffing Surveys  
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Table 5 
Incidence of  Performance-Based Teacher Compensation 
 
    
 Teacher Weighted (%) 
District Rewards Following:    
 1999-00 2003-04 change 
NBPTS 22.9 39.8 17.0 
Excellence in Teaching 13.6 14.0 0.3 
In-service professional development 38.8 35.9 -3.0 
Teach in less desirable location 11.2 13.1 1.9 
Teach in fields of shortage 23.6 25.3 1.7 
    
Number of incentives    
None  39.2 31.1 -8.0 
1 incentive 33.1 35.5 2.5 
2 incentives 16.0 21.0 5.0 
3 incentives 5.9 10.2 4.2 
4 incentives 2.0 4.5 2.5 
5 incentives 3.9 0.7 -3.2 
    
Based on student achievement, were    
any schools in the district rewarded     
in any of the following ways?    
    
Cash bonus/addl resources for school-    
wide activity   --- 19.6   --- 
Cash bonus/addl resources for 
teachers   --- 15.4   --- 
Schools given non-monetary forms of   --- 30.4   --- 
recognition    
    
 
Source:  Schools and Staffing Surveys, various years.  
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Table 6 
Recruitment Incentives by Teaching Field* 
Reward to recruit/retain teachers in fields of shortage   change 
 1987-88 1990-91 1993-94 1999-00 2003-04 1987-88 to 03-
04 
District provides incentive 11.3 % 16.6 % 18.7 % 23.6 % 25.3 % 14.0 % 
       
Elementary --- --- --- 2.4 2.6 ---- 
Special ed 6.7 11.8 13.4 14.3 20.6 13.9 
English/language arts --- --- --- 5.3 4.2 --- 
Social studies --- --- --- 1.6 2.4  
Computer sci 1.4 2.9 1.3 3.4 3.4 2.0 
Mathematics 5.2 5.8 3.9 8.9 15.7 10.5 
Physical  Sciences 3.6 5.0 3.9 8.4 13.4 9.8 
Biological sci 3.8 4.3 3.7 8.4 12.8 8.9 
English as Second Lang 3.3 7.6 8.1 11.1 15.5 12.2 
Foreign lang 2.4 3.1 2.4 5.3 9.4 7.0 
Music or art --- --- --- 4.9 6.4 ---- 
Vocatio---l or technical 
educ/ 
--- 4.7 3.2 8.0 7.3 ---- 
Other fields  4.2 4.2 1.6 --- --- ---- 
 
* “Does this district currently use any pay incentives to recruit or retain teachers to teach 
in fields of shortage?” 
 
Source:  Schools and Staffing Surveys, various years.  School District surveys. 
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End Notes 
                                                 
1  However, there is growing interest in market-based reforms of educator compensation.   
Experiments and pilot programs are under way in a number of countries.   For surveys 
see Sclafani and Tucker (2006) and   Podgursky and Springer (2007).   A companion 
chapter in this volume examines research on teacher performance pay (Neal, 2009). 
2  In theory, the same quality decline should have been observed in other “crowded” 
female dominated occupations such as nurses and librarians.   We are unaware of any 
evidence in this regard.  
3  Leigh and Ryan (2006) document a similar decline in academic skills for Australian 
teachers that coincides with a decline in teacher relative pay.    
4  Leigh and Ryan (2006) attempt a similar decomposition for Australian teachers over a 
smaller time span, 1983-2003.   As noted in fn. 3, they find a similar decline in high 
ability males and females entering teaching.   In their decomposition, relative pay rather 
than pay compression within teaching mattered much more.  This is primarily due to the 
fact that little pay compression within teaching occurred over this time interval.    
5  See also Dolton (2006).  International data on relative teacher salaries are reported in 
OECD (2001, 2009).   
6  Of course, if staffing ratios fall and relative teacher pay falls, applicant queues will fall 
as well.   Whether, and to what extent,  this lowers teacher quality is taken up below. 
7  Our choice of 1980 as a benchmark is benign.   Hanushek (1986, Table 3 ) shows that 
the trend toward declining student teacher ratio was underway at least several decades 
earlier – falling from 25.8 in 1960 to 19.0 by 1980. 
8  However, there are no data suggesting that the school day or school year have 
increased over time. 
9  Ehrenberg and Smith (1991) p. 494, note express skepticism about the general 
relevance of these models, but note that teacher union contracts are one of the few 
examples where the union bargains over both earnings and employment (i.e., maximum 
class size).  
10  Teacher union dues in the United States are in dollars and not a percent of salaries.   
Thus an increase in dues revenue that arises from increases in teacher employment is 
automatic, whereas an increase arising from higher salaries requires a vote of the 
membership to raise per capita dues.   This provides an incentive for union officials to 
favor lower staffing ratios over higher salaries.  Hoxby (1996) finds a negative effect of 
teacher unionization on student-teacher ratios. 
11 Moe and Chubb (2009) provide an extensive discussion of teacher union efforts to 
resist adoption of computer-based instruction and distance learning technologies.   
12 The argument is sometimes made that work at home by teachers offsets this difference.  
The most extensive U.S. data on household time allocation is the American Time Use 
Survey (ATUS).  A recent ATUS study examined work time allocation for full-time 
teachers and other professionals.  Krantz-Kent (2008) found that more teachers were 
likely to report work at home during a weekday than other professionals.  However, 
combining home and on-site work,  teachers worked 24 minutes per weekday less than 
other professionals, and 42 fewer minutes on Saturdays.   On Sundays teachers and other 
professionals worked about the same amount of time (roughly one hour).   
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13  Nor is there evidence that most teachers who leave the profession earn more in their 
new occupations.  See Stinebrickner, Scafini, and Sjodquist (2002),  Podgursky, Monroe, 
and Watson (2004), Goldhaber and Player (2005).   
14   The NCS is an establishment survey of employee salaries, wages, and benefits. It is 
designed to produce reliable earnings and benefit estimates at local levels, within broad 
regions, and nationwide (http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ocs/comfaq.htm).   
15  As noted above, the OECD now reports routinely international relative salary data for 
teachers, typically normed by GDP per capita (e.g., OECD, 2009).  The U.S. ranks low in 
comparison to other developed countries by these measures, although spending per 
student ranks high.   In part this reflects the low staffing ratios in the U.S.  However, it 
should also be kept in mind that the fringe benefits for U.S. teachers compare very 
favorably to private sector employees.   Other developed nations have national health 
insurance schemes, while the U.S. does not.   This makes teacher health benefits 
relatively attractive.   As noted in the text, the retirement benefits in relation to salary on 
average are also much higher for teachers.    
16  In general, aggregated studies have tended to find more positive effects of “inputs” on 
student achievement outputs than disaggregated student-level panel studies.  For a 
discussion of this point see Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996).  
17  Ballou finds that graduates from more selective institutions (conditional on 
certification) file as many applications as non-selective applicants, but are no more likely 
to be hired.   Nor does he find evidence  that “choosiness” by the former in applications is 
the explanation.   Education majors are favored over academic majors as well.    
18   If all types of teachers of all quality types enter the labor market in response to an 
increase in relative pay, and schools are undiscriminating in either their hiring or firing, 
then the probability of getting a “good” teaching job for a high quality teacher may 
actually fall.   This can act to lower the high quality share of the applicant labor pool, and 
hence average teacher quality. 
19  These salary schedules remain the primary determinant of  U.S. teacher pay.   As we 
will note below, some districts have begun to experiment with performance or market-
based adjustments.   This has been encouraged by several federal initiatives discussed 
below. Ballou (2001) finds that even when public schools report the use of performance 
bonuses, their effect on pay for recipients is very small.   This is also seen in direct 
examination of performance pay plans actually enacted by districts (Podgursky and 
Springer, 2007).  
20   Further evidence on this point may be found in Goldhaber and Player (2005), who 
analyze the non-teaching earnings of former teachers by broad teaching field.   
Elementary school teachers on average earned less than secondary school teachers, and 
among former secondary teachers, those who taught in technical fields earned more than 
those in non-technical fields.  
21  The Schools and Staffing Surveys does not ask a collective bargaining question of 
private schools.  However, we are aware of no private schools organized by the major 
teaching unions.  Some Catholic dioceses negotiate agreements with Catholic teacher 
associations.  However, these agreements are far less restrictive than anything negotiated 
in public schools, and Catholic school teachers do not have tenure.   
22 The U.S. as well has a growing private and test preparation market, with national 
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franchises such as Sylvan Learning Centers, Princeton Review, Kaplan, and Kumon, 
along with independent local firms.   Unfortunately, the U.S. Department of Education 
does not collect data on these firms or their staff.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that these 
firms do hire moonlighting and retired teachers as well as regular full time staff. 
23 NEA, 1995, p. 3.  As the NEA report points out, however, this purpose has “been lost 
for many in the mists of time,” and “many pension administrators would be hard-pressed 
to give an account of why their systems are structured as is except to say that ‘the 
Legislature did it’ or ‘It is a result of bargaining.’” 
24 Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) showed the incentives for early retirement in private defined 
benefit pension plans and argued that their spread in the postwar period contributed to 
declining labor force participation of older workers up to that time.  More recently, 
Friedberg and Webb (2005) showed that the private sector shift toward defined 
contribution plans contributed to the rise of retirement ages since the 1980s.   With regard 
to teachers, Harris and Adams (2007) find considerably higher rates of labor force exit at 
ages 56-64 than in comparable professions, as well as evidence that this is due to their 
pension coverage. 
25  Clark (2009).  Since retiree health insurance is largely funded pay as you go by 
districts and states, the BLS does not treat it as a benefit for current active teachers.    
26  The teacher’s earnings rise along a typical California salary schedule (Sacramento).   
For other details, see Costrell and Podgursky (2009b). 
27 SASS includes private schools and teachers as well. However, the focus of this study is 
on trends in public schools. 
28 “Does the district currently use any pay incentives such as a cash bonuses, salary 
increase, or different steps on a salary schedule to reward …?”  
29 Interestingly, the rank order of district implementation of these incentives is nearly the 
opposite of teacher preferences, as reported in a recent study of Washington teachers by 
Goldhaber, DeArmond, DeBurgomaster (2007).  Bonuses for teaching in a less desirable 
location were the most favored incentive ( 63%), followed by NBPTS (20%), shortage 
fields (12%), and performance pay (6 %).     
30 Note that these recruitment incentives can take the form of cash bonuses, higher pay, or 
higher initial placement on the salary schedule.  The latter is more subtle, and thus less 
controversial, than explicit bonuses or differentiated pay structures. 
31 The NEA membership is over 2.7 million while the AFT has roughly 1.3 million 
members.   Note that these membership figures include retired members, as well as 
education support personnel.   Both unions have higher education members as well.  
(Kahlenberg, 2006). 
32 The collective bargaining agreement in the LA Unified school district (with appendices 
and supplements) is 348 single-spaced pages.  The web site of the National Center on 
Teacher Quality maintains a searchable database of the collective bargaining for one 
hundred of the largest school districts in the U.S. :   www.nctq.org 
33  A conventional errors-in-variables model would suggest that the Hoxby estimates 
were biased toward zero.   In an appendix to the paper,  Lovenheim develops an 
extension of the classical model with a discrete regressor, drawing on work by Bound, 
Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001).  He tests and rejects the hypothesis that the classification 
error is “non-differential,”  the discrete analogue of classical measurement error. 
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34  Similar findings are reported in West and Mykerezi (2009).  Lavy (2008) considers and 
dismisses a different variant of the “nature of teaching” hypothesis.   He finds that 
women (who comprise roughly 80 percent of teachers ) are no less likely to respond to or 
succeed in a performance pay system. 
35  These are from the web site of the Center for Education Reform (www.edreform.com), 
which tracks charter schools state by state and up-to-date.  The most recent data on 
charters available from the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. 
Department of Education are for school year 2003-04.  They report 2179 charter schools 
with a total enrollment of 627,000 students.   The number of charters and total 
enrollments is growing rapidly. 
36 Interesting evidence in this regard is Abdulkadiroglu, et. al (2009).   This is a 
randomized study of Boston area charter and Pilot schools (students were admitted to 
these schools by lottery.)   Charter schools were not covered by the teacher collective 
bargaining agreement while the Pilot schools were. Although some work rules were 
relaxed, tenure, salary schedules, and many seniority provisions remained in place.   The 
authors found large positive effects on student achievement in the charter schools but 
mixed and sometimes negative effects in the Pilot schools.    
